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Abstract
As fake news elicits an emotional response from users, whose attention is then monetised, political advertising has a sig-
nificant influence on its production and dissemination. Facebook ads, therefore, have an essential role in contemporary
political communication, not only because of their extensive use in international political campaigns, but also because they
address intriguing questions about the regulation of disinformation on social networking sites. This research employs a
corpus of 14,684 Facebook ads published by the major national political parties during their campaigns leading up to the
two Spanish general elections held in 2019. A manual content analysis was performed on all the visually identical ads so as
to identify those containing disinformation and those denouncing it. The topics addressed in these ads were then exam-
ined. The results show that the political parties’ Facebook ad strategies were akin to those of conventional advertising.
Disinformation messages were infrequent and mainly posted by Ciudadanos and VOX. Nonetheless, it is striking that the
main topic addressed in the ads was the unity of Spain—precisely the issue of Catalonia’s independence. In light of this,
it can be deduced that ‘traditional’ parties are taking longer to renounce classical forms of campaigning than their ‘new’
counterparts, thus demonstrating that the actors implementing disinformation strategies are not only restricted to the
extreme right of the ideological spectrum.
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1. Introduction
The phenomenon of digital disinformation has become
particularly relevant in recent years, not only due to its
widespread use in many countries (Bradshaw & Howard,
2019), but also because of the Internet’s capacity to
amplify it, which, in turn, has repercussions for political
life insofar as it undermines reliable information sources
(Benkler, Faris, & Roberts, 2018; Bennett & Livingston,
2018). Although some of those repercussions are unfore-
seen, others are clearly intentional. Campaigns of this
sort are mainly launched on social networking sites such
as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and WhatsApp, and the
main techniques are basedon theuseof bots (automated
accounts that mimic human behaviour) and trolls (fake
accounts managed by humans with specific intentions;
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Bradshaw&Howard, 2019). Actually, it is not easy to iden-
tify who promotes these campaigns, although there are
always political interests behind them.
Political parties are also active on social media. They
post content like any other user, but also leverage adver-
tising techniques, inserting sponsored content in news
feeds in order to take advantage of the microtarget-
ing capabilities of social media. Due to the Cambridge
Analytica scandal, Facebook made sponsored content
available to any user through its Facebook Ad Library
(Hern, 2018), thus allowing the public to scrutinise the
paid messages posted by political parties on this social
networking site. As such content was inaccessible only a
few years ago, research on digital disinformation has yet
to explore political advertising on Facebook.
Some of the first elections to be called after this
disclosure were held in Spain, specifically general elec-
tions on 28 April and 10 November 2019. So the
election campaigns running up to them were pre-
ceded by the disinformation scandals in the United
States, the United Kingdom and Brazil. Studies of this
electoral cycle have revealed that disinformation was
mainly spread via Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp
(Paniagua Rojano, Seoane Pérez, &Magallón-Rosa, 2020;
Rodríguez-Fernández, 2020).
Accordingly, the aim of this article is to contribute to
the research on digital disinformation by analysing the
messages conveyed by the major Spanish political par-
ties in the 2019 general election campaigns, using the
Facebook Ads tool. The main research question posed
here is whether or not those parties implemented any
disinformation strategy as regards their sponsored con-
tent on Facebook. As far as can be gathered from the
literature, the dissemination of political disinformation
via Facebook advertising is still an uncharted research
avenue. Whereby the originality of this study, whose pur-
pose is to fill that research gap, lies in the fact that it is pre-
sumably the first to focus on the Facebook Ads Library.
The presence of disinformation in the advertising
messages of the major political parties in Spain, albeit
rather thin on the ground, is by no means a minor object
of study, inasmuch as those posting them have a lot
to gain from this in the political contest. Even though
Spanish political ads are by and large conventional, the
findings of this study suggest they can include false infor-
mation with an eye to manipulating public opinion.
This article is structured as follows. First, the theo-
retical framework is developed, distinguishing between
several concepts relating to disinformation, such as fake
news and propaganda. This is followed by a description
of how the 14,684-ad database was created and of the
content analysis methodology employed. Lastly, the find-
ings are presented and discussed.
2. Theoretical Framework
The development of computational techniques for
content creation and distribution (Tucker, Theocharis,
Roberts, & Barberá, 2018) has contributed to place dis-
information at the centre of political processes at an
international level. The growing academic literature has
explored disinformation operations in diverse contexts
and at different hierarchical levels. This is the case
of the use of Twitter by the president of the United
States, Donald Trump (Marwick & Lewis, 2017; Ross
& Rivers, 2018); the use of bots during the French
presidential elections (Ferrara, 2017); the distribution
of emotional and polarised information in the United
Kingdom during the Brexit referendum campaign (Bastos
& Mercea, 2018; Cervi & Carrillo-Andrade, 2019); the
referendum on self-determination in Catalonia (Stella,
Ferrara, & De Domenico, 2018); and the recent pub-
lication of false information on Covid-19 in order to
bolster Jair Bolsonaro’s leadership (Ricard & Medeiros,
2020). All these processes have highlighted the crucial
role played by reliable information in any democratic sys-
tem. Consequently, terms such as disinformation, fake
news or even propaganda have entered into the public
debate on politics. Nevertheless, these concepts are not
easy to distinguish, as they are used in different ways in
diverse scenarios (Magallón-Rosa, 2019).
There still is not a unanimous consensus on the def-
inition of fake news. After the popularisation of this
expression by the media, the concept has become even
more vague (Bennett& Livingston, 2018; Ireton&Posetti,
2018). In their review of the academic literature on
fake news, Tandoc, Lim, and Ling (2018) discovered that
the term was indeed used to define up to six different
types: news satire, news parody, fabrication, manipu-
lation, advertising and propaganda. In addition to the
efforts that have been made to identify and describe the
disinformation tactics of parties and public authorities,
some authors have contributed to research on this phe-
nomenon by establishing taxonomies that, as analytical
tools, shed light on the boundaries between propaganda
and disinformation. These notions have been considered
to be interchangeable by some authors, as is the case
with the terms propaganda and publicity (Tandoc et al.,
2018). According toWoolley and Howard (2016, p. 4886):
Computational propaganda involves software
programs that are interactive and ideologically
imbued….They are ideological, first, in that they are
programmed to promote a particular perspective in
politically charged conversations and, second, in that
they are artifactual evidence of the idea that technol-
ogy can be used to influence politics.
For Jack (2017), propaganda is a pejorative term per se,
as opposed to other concepts such as advertising, public
relations and public diplomacy. The first term refers to
a deliberate intention to manipulate or deceive, which
“can refer to political communications, advertising, and
even junk mail” (Jack, 2017, p. 7).
The epistemological difficulty in differentiating
between disinformation and propaganda stems from
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two of themain characteristics that both concepts share:
the hyperpolarisation of their content and their cre-
ation for political purposes (Nielsen & Graves, 2017).
Therefore, although it cannot be called fake news in
the strict sense of the word, information released by
governments, public agencies and parties reflects their
agendas in a way that differs from that of objective and
evidence-based information (Molina, Sundar, Le, & Lee,
2019). Propaganda and advertising include information
that is usually based on facts, but with a bias that helps
to present the propagandist or advertiser in a favourable
light. The use of native advertising for disseminating
this type of content makes it seem more credible, due
to its similarity to other media publications or social
media posts (Tandoc et al., 2018). In contrast, disinfor-
mation is a phenomenon that deliberately seeks to con-
fuse the receiver with false or misleading information,
with the aim of achieving persuasive goals or discred-
iting an opponent. Disinformation, from this perspec-
tive, can be regarded as a powerful propaganda tool
(Benkler et al., 2018; Martin, 1982). Following Bennett
and Livingston’s (2018) reasoning, the phenomenon of
fabricating and disseminating intentionally false informa-
tion will be referred to here as disinformation. The inten-
tion is to convey its complexity, focusing not only on false
information per se, but also on the strategies behind it.
This grey area between disinformation, propaganda
and advertising evinces the complexity of this phe-
nomenon in contemporary political processes. It gives a
good account of the multiple and sophisticated tactics
that are deployed to gain control of the narrative and to
manipulate the electorate (Marwick& Lewis, 2017). Such
tactics have given rise to a broad debate on their short-
and long-term effects on democratic systems, whose
legitimacy is currently being questioned, reflected in a
decline in the credibility of politicians and public insti-
tutions in the eyes of the public at large (Bennett &
Livingston, 2018; Tucker et al., 2018).
In this complex digital landscape, social media adver-
tising has been operating as an opaque way to dissem-
inate information. Through these tools, companies can
send their ads to specific social media audiences in such
a way that only they view the message (Tufekci, 2015;
Woolley&Howard, 2018). The capacity of social network-
ing sites to segment audiences is based on the rich digital
footprint left by users on them (Kim et al., 2018; Sinclair,
2016). In this vein, several researchers have raised the
need to act on sponsored content owing to its poten-
tial to disseminate disinformation (Gray, Bounegru, &
Venturini, 2020). Particularly in the case of Facebook,
some scholars have shown how this platform has been
used to divide the population and to misinform, specif-
ically in the case of ads paid for by Russia’s Internet
Research Agency in the United States (Lukito, 2020;
Ribeiro et al., 2019).
Social networking sites are very appealing to adver-
tisers. The business model of these sites, of which
Facebook is the paradigm, has been built on their ad
services (Dommett & Power, 2019; Kreiss & McGregor,
2018). Not only companies but also political parties’ fig-
ure among their advertisers. However, the Cambridge
Analytica scandal obliged Facebook to modify some of
its practices. This social networking site decided, among
other things, to put an end to the lack of transparency of
the content sponsored by political parties. Accordingly,
in April 2018 the Facebook Ad Library was launched with
the aimof offering the public access to the paidmessages
of political parties being disseminated in its news feed
(Hern, 2018).
This issue of social media accountability forms part
of a broader debate on seeking solutions to an increas-
ingly polarised, uninformed, and fragmented networking
ecosystem (Bakir & McStay, 2018). These sceptical views
ultimately beg the question of the extent to which gen-
uine civic engagement with democratic systems can be
ensured on platforms that, as in the case of Facebook,
rely on user metrics and the imperatives of advertising
to turn a profit (Jack, 2017). The aim of this article is
to offer an answer to this research question by focus-
ing on the role played by political parties as clients of
Facebook and how they address the controversial issue
of disinformation.
3. Methodology
The object of study were the ads posted on Facebook by
the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (hereinafter PSOE),
the People’s Party (hereinafter PP), Ciudadanos, Unidas
Podemos—a coalition between Podemos and United
Left (hereinafter IU)—and VOX, the five parties with the
best election prospects, during the pre- and election
campaigns running up to the two general elections held
in Spain in 2019 (on 28 April and 10 November). In order
to perform an in-depth analysis on the kind of strategies
that they were implementing, it was decided to consider
Podemos and IU separately because their Facebook ads
were mainly posted on their party pages, rather than on
the coalition page.
The corpus was obtained through a web crawler writ-
ten in Python. The Facebook Ad Library displays the ads
paid for by a particular organisation in grid-format. This
initial presentation provides the basic content of the
ads with a link to access the metadata. This metadata,
which is displayed on a new webpage, includes run time,
advertiser spend, impressions and basic demographic
segmentation, namely, sex, age, and autonomous com-
munity (geographical region). The first three metadata
sets are shown in text format,while the last three are pro-
vided in image files. The crawler visited the library page
of each political party and, after verifying that the ads
corresponded to the two general elections under study,
accessed each one of the admetadata webpages, before
downloading the content (text and image/video) and the
metadata (text and image files) of the ad in question.
The corpus was made up of 14,684 ads (see Table 1
for their distribution by political party). As the Facebook
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Table 1. Information on the ads making up the corpus.
Political Party No. ads Estimated spend (€) Estimated impressions
Ciudadanos 8,560 584,100 70,436,500
IU 18 4,750 1,207,500
PP 4,517 489,350 60,235,500
Podemos 924 995,100 129,992,000
PSOE 621 69,350 22,767,500
VOX 44 2,800 881,500
Total 14,684 2,145,450 285,520,500
Ad Library only provides ranges of values, the data on
advertiser spend and impressions were not exact fig-
ures. To facilitate comparisons, ad spend, and impres-
sions were estimated, taking into account the mean
value of the range. For example, if the spend range of
an ad was €100–€499, its mean value €300 was taken.
The same procedure was used to calculate ad impres-
sions. As a result, it was estimated that the five political
parties spent approximately €2 million on the two elec-
tion campaigns, with roughly 286 million impressions.
Ciudadanos and the PP were the two parties posting the
highest number of ads, while Podemos and Ciudadanos
made the largest investment.
Although the data are presented here in an aggre-
gated manner, it should be explained that the number
of ads posted in both campaigns was not proportional
(see Figure 1). This might have been owing to the fact
that the campaign for the 10 November elections lasted
half as long as that for the 28 April elections, due to
both a Spanish law limiting the campaign period for
repeated general elections and the more austere cam-
paigns designed by all the parties after a year replete
with election calls in Spain.
Following an initial data analysis, it was noted that
there were numerous repetitions in the ad content. This
was due to the microtargeting capabilities of Facebook:
The same content was used in multiple ads, each with a
different sociodemographic audience profile, which will
be referred to hereinafter as ‘visually identical ads’ (VIAs).
They cannot be regarded as mere duplicates because,
albeit with the same content, each VIA had a differ-
ent target audience (e.g., users in specific geographical
locations), spend and number of impressions. Each ad
formed part of a complex communication strategy aimed
at engaging a predetermined Facebook audience with a
particular discourse. To perform the analysis, only these
VIAs (1,743) were used.
Two variables were defined for the content analysis.
The first is the type of information contained in the ads,
which fell into the following two categories: 1) does not
contain facts (generic calls to vote or election promises);


























Figure 1. Ads posted by the parties during the 28 April and 10 November election campaigns (2019).
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victim of disinformation, manipulated by the media or
its political rivals); 3) contains disinformation (when ad
content is misleading or directly false); 4) and contains
facts (their interpretation may sometimes be more or
less biased, but nonetheless cannot be regarded as dis-
information). All the ads that contained verifiable facts
were fact-checked through news media and other infor-
mation sources.
The second variable is linked to the main topics of
the ads, whichwere classified in the following categories,
designed on the basis of a preliminary study of the cor-
pus: 1) employment; 2) party promotion; 3) Spain’s cohe-
sion (Catalan independence issue, glorification of the
country); 4) social policy; 5) economic policy; 6) femi-
nism; 7) pacts, coalitions and surveys; 8) education and
science; 9) environment; 10) democratic quality (corrup-
tion); 11) empty Spain (referring to the depopulation
of rural areas in the interior); 12) international policy;
13) immigration; 14) infrastructure; and 15) others.
Different teams, each formed by two of the authors
of the research, coded each variable. Inter-rater reliabil-
ity was evaluated using Krippendorff’s alpha, obtaining
acceptable values for the (dis)information (𝛼 = 0.808)
and topic (𝛼 = 0.904) variables.
4. Results
4.1. Use of Disinformation
The presence of disinformation in the electoral propa-
ganda distributed on Facebook by the five main Spanish
political parties during the two 2019 general election
campaigns was, as can be seen from the data, negligible
(see Table 2). Therewere fewoccasions onwhich disinfor-
mation appeared in the ads’ copy, either as a technique
of persuasion or as a complaint.
As can be observed, the vast majority of the ads fell
into the first category: they contained phrases that gener-
ically appealed to the electorate, attempted to drum up
support for the political party in question or set out the
party’s electoral proposals, the veracity of which cannot
be verified, of course, until the party is in a position to
implement them either by forming a government or by
being able to exert political influence. Of the total num-
ber of ads posted, 83.71% (78.03% when including the
VIAs) fell into this category.
Regarding the ads that included potentially verifiable
claims, most of them were accurate or based on real-
ity, thus being closer to propaganda discourse than to
disinformation. Of the total number of ads, 14.22% (ris-
ing to 20.14%, when including the VIAs) belonged to
this category.
All of which means that only 2% of the ads contained
disinformation. This is by no means a negligible propor-
tion, but it does indicate that it is not a technique applied
by Spanish political parties across the board, neither as
a discursive device to report being victims of disinforma-
tion operations (12 ads in total) nor as examples of disin-
formation per se (292 ads, 1.99% of the total).
4.2. Disinformation by Party
Table 3 shows the distribution by party (in both elec-
tion campaigns) of the different categories used here to
detect disinformation or its absence. As before, a distinc-
tion can be drawn between the VIAs and the total num-
ber of ads posted. It can be seen that the incidence of
disinformation parameters was minimal in general and
non-existent in the case of IU and the PSOE. The latter
developed a campaign focusing on the formulation of
electoral proposals or campaign slogans, which did not
even include facts that could be checked or verified.
In the main, Ciudadanos was the party posting the
highest number of ads containing elements of disinfor-
mation, while the PP, Podemos and VOX did so to a lesser
extent. Only these last two parties posted ads reporting
alleged disinformation practices against them. Table 4
shows the incidence of disinformation in the relative per-
centage of each party and the corpus as a whole.
Podemos reported disinformation campaigns against
it in three different ads. The first recommended a two-
minute video explaining how “the state’s rotten apples”
(Podemos, 2019)were intriguing against the party and its
leader, Pablo Iglesias, focusing on the alleged manoeu-
vres of the Ministry of the Interior controlled at the
time by Jorge Fernández Díaz (PP), which in theory
were being silenced by the media and the powers that
be: political institutions, economic elites and members
of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies. This
same line of argument was deployed in the other two
ads, one of which commented on the party’s intention
not to “spend hours talking to media outlets owned
by banks” (Podemos, 2019), while the other invited
readers to receive the party’s information directly on
their cell phones to avoid “fake news against Podemos”
(Podemos, 2019).
Table 2. Overall results of the disinformation analysis.
Disinformation No. VIAs % VIAs Total no. ads % Total ads
Does not contain facts 1,360 78.03% 12,292 83.71%
Reports disinformation 11 0.63% 12 0.08%
Contains disinformation 21 1.20% 292 1.99%
Contains facts (not disinformation) 351 20.14% 2,088 14.22%
Total 1,743 100.00% 14,684 100.00%
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Table 3. Distribution of the disinformation variable by party (%).
Contains facts
Does not contain facts Reports disinformation Contains disinformation (not disinformation)
Party VIAs Total VIAs Total VIAs Total VIAs Total
Ciudadanos 10.96 46.84 0 0 0.70 1.89 2.58 9.57
IU 0.69 0.11 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.01
PP 30.75 26.65 0 0 0.23 0.06 14.17 4.05
Podemos 12.97 5.69 0.34 0.04 0.06 0.02 3.10 0.54
PSOE 22.38 4.23 0 0 0 0 0 0
VOX 0.29 0.20 0.29 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.17 0.04
Total 78.03 83.71 0.63 0.08 1.20 1.99 20.14 14.22
Regarding VOX, the high proportion of VIAs (33%,
albeit accounting for a scant proportion of the total num-
ber of ads and therefore not representative) in which
this party presented itself as a victim of disinformation is
noteworthy. In all cases, the party used the same text—
“At VOX we play fair, we do not use the left’s black propa-
ganda techniques or spread hoaxes as others do” (VOX,
2019)—together with an image corresponding to the
main message, in an attempt to counter calls for tacti-
cal voting, namely that voting for VOX in most provinces
meant giving seats to the PSOE or Podemos.
When the data in this category is crossed with the
thematic classification (see Table 5), it can be seen that
Podemos reported disinformation about issues pertain-
ing to democratic quality and party promotion, whereas
VOX, as well asmentioning the same topics, also referred
to the cohesion of Spain and the environment. Likewise,
considering the difference between the VIAs and the
total, it can be observed that this kind of message was
not amplified (i.e., repeated in the corpus) and that itwas
a marginal issue.
4.3. Ads with Disinformation
The incidence of ads incorporating elements of disinfor-
mation is shown in Table 6. The parties that resorted
most to this kind of discourse were VOX (13.33% of the
total number of VIAs) and Ciudadanos (5.6%). Whereas
Podemos and the PP were the two parties that posted
this type of message a lot less frequently.
As to the PP, therewas hardly any disinformation in its
ads. Instead, the party chose to include information that
best contrasted itsmanagement with that of the Sánchez
government (PSOE). For example, in those provinceswith
rising unemployment rates, it was Sánchez’s fault; in
those where jobs were being created, it was thanks to
Table 4. Reports of cases of disinformation against parties (%).
VIAs Total
Party VIAs (n = 1,743) (N = 14,684)
Ciudadanos 0 0 0
IU 0 0 0
PP 0 0 0
Podemos 2.09 0.34 0.04
PSOE 0 0 0
VOX 33.33 0.29 0.04
Total 0.63 0.08
Table 5. Reports of disinformation classified by party and by topic (%).
Podemos VOX
Theme VIAs Total VIAs Total Total
Spain’s cohesion 0.00 0.00 13.33 0.01 0.01
Democratic quality 1.05 0.02 6.67 0.01 0.03
Environment 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.01 0.01
Party promotion 1.05 0.02 6.67 0.01 0.03
Total 2.09 0.04 33.33 0.04 0.08
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the efforts of “everyone,” the “entrepreneurs.” The same
can be said about Podemos. By and large, this party did
not cross the line separating an interpretation of reality
that was favourable to its interests but fact-based, from
disinformation or the dissemination of false information.
Both parties posted a single ad that can be regarded as
having contained disinformation.
The PP’s ad, which was repeated on several occa-
sions, read as follows: “Whenever the PSOE governs, it
gives rise🚀 to uncertainty. Something called risk pre-
mium increases📈.We all pay for it. Vote for the People’s
Party #SafeValue. 👉www.ppvalorseguro.es” (Partido
Socialista, 2019).
Although Spain’s risk premium (the rate of return
that a country issuing sovereign bonds has to pay over
and above the risk-free rate of return) rose during the
PSOE governments (especially in the last years of the
Rodríguez Zapatero government), this has been by no
means a systematic trend. Indeed, during the first year
of the Rajoy government, Spain’s risk premiumhit a euro-
era record (Expansión, n.d.).
There was also disinformation in an ad about the
wage gap:
If you’re a woman, you’re paid 22.3% less than a man
for doing the same job. This means that it’s like work-
ing for FREE for two months of the year. On 28 April,
your vote for Unidas Podemos can guarantee equal
pay by law. (Podemos, 2019)
On average, women still earn 22.3% less than men. Be
that as it may, this should be qualified. Women do not
earn 22.3% less than men for doing the same job, but,
as a rule, men have better-paid jobs. Other similar ads,
plus the video accompanying this same ad, did explain
this correctly.
Regarding Ciudadanos, its use of disinformation can
be directly associatedwith its often-aggressive discourse.
This belligerence, combined with a more varied, sophis-
ticated and segmented discourse than that of the PP,
meant that it wasmore liable to include inaccuracies and
fallacies in its ads than the PP, whose ads tended to be
more traditional and ingratiating.
One such example can be found in the large number
of ads posted by Ciudadanos on occasion of its recruit-
ment of Edmundo Bal, the public prosecutor who was
removed from the case against the pro-independence
‘procès,’ due to his discrepancies with the Government’s
line of action. Bal had sought a conviction for rebellion
versus the accusation of sedition for which the Attorney
General’s Office pressed and for which the majority of
the prosecuted politicians were ultimately condemned.
According to these ads, “👎Sánchez removed him as a
favour to Torra, Rufián and Puigdemont so as to continue
in theMoncloa” (Ciudadanos, 2019), something that has
yet to be substantiated.
In other ads that, with slight variations, were also
repeated, Ciudadanos contended: “While the PP and
the PSOE were making a pact with Pujol and ERC,
Inés Arrimadas and Albert Rivera were fighting for the
freedom and equality of all Spaniards in Catalonia”
(Ciudadanos, 2019). However, the last time the PP struck
an agreement with Jordi Pujol was in the year 2000. The
Catalan leader abandoned active politics in 2003, three
years before Ciudadanos appeared on the scene. In short,
in this ad, as in the previous one, the truth (the agree-
ments that the PP and the PSOE had brokered with the
nationalists in the past) was distorted by mixing it with
false or misleading information.
Ciudadanos also posted seven more VIAs that were
reported by various media for their misleading content
(Sarabia, 2020). These ads were aimed at the Andalusian
provinces, except for Cordoba, encouraging the elec-
torate to vote for the party as it was just a few votes away
from winning a seat at the expense of Podemos. As the
fact-checker Maldita (“La publicidad de Ciudadanos,”
2019) pointed out, however, it was impossible for the
party to know this and, therefore, to claim:
👀 In the province of Huelva, Ciudadanos is 190 votes
away from winning a decisive seat at the expense
of Podemos. We all want to oust Sánchez from the
Moncloa, but in Huelva, voting for Ciudadanos is the
best way to achieve this. (Ciudadanos, 2019)
Lastly, despite the party’s scant visibility on Facebook,
VOX also included disinformation in its ads. In 15 dif-
ferent ads, most of which were integrated into the
same VIA, there were elements of disinformation in
two. The first read as follows: “The PP, the PSOE and
Ciudadanos: different paths, same objectives. Politically,
socially and now also linguistically imposing Catalan on
the Balearic Islands, with VOX as the only opposition.
📢🇪🇸 #VOXGenuineOpposition” (VOX, 2019).
From this ad it can be deduced that the PP, the
PSOE and Ciudadanos had all voted against VOX to
“impose Catalan on the Balearic Islands” (Loureiro, Muro,
& Alonso, 2019). It was indeed a block of amendments
proposed by VOX which, according to the law, had to
be voted on as a whole. In this block, VOX included
some amendments that were acceptable to ideologically
like-minded parties (as is the case of language policy)
and others that were totally unacceptable to them. This
placed those parties in a dilemma, for if they rejected the
block of amendments, VOX could claim that they were
in cahoots with the left, whereas if they accepted them,
the left could contend that they were indistinguishable
from VOX. It is something that this party does very often
because it knows that the news coverage will, in one way
or another, be to its advantage (Loureiro et al., 2019).
Another ad recommended a video of an interview
with Santiago Abascal, the leader of VOX, in which he
referred to an unaccompanied foreign minor accused of
sexually abusing a 10-year-old girl in Calella (Barcelona).
Abascal, among other things, stated the following:
“An unaccompanied foreign minor sexually abused a
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10-year-old girl. The abuser is now at liberty. With a
restraining order not to approach the victim, he will be
able to approach others, we imagine” (VOX, 2019). From
this statement it can be inferred that the accused had
already been sentenced when, in reality, he had been
sent to a juvenile facility, under the restraining order
not to approach the victim, pending trial (“Detenido un
menor,” 2019).
Likewise, when viewed from a thematic perspective
(see Table 6 and Figure 2) these data reveal the focus
of these disinformation messages. In all the categories,
the topic of Spain’s cohesion, referring to the Catalan
independence issue and the glorification of the country,
stands out. The subject of democratic quality, relating to
corruption, was the second most frequent theme with
respect to the dissemination of disinformation.
The most used topics to denounce disinformation
were democratic quality and party promotion, normally
associated with a recommended information diet, which
tended to be the party’s own channel.
Concerning the core topics of the ads, it should
be stressed that 13 VIAs posted by Ciudadanos about
Spain’s cohesion or democratic quality corresponded to
228 and 49, respectively, of the total number of ads mak-
ing up the corpus. Ciudadanos was the party that aired
these topicsmost, while the PP focused on economic pol-
icy (two VIAs out of seven), Podemos referred most to
feminism (one VIA out of three) and VOX put the accent
on ‘other subjects’ (one VIA out of two). As can be seen in
Table 6, Ciudadanos posted most disinformation (1.55%
of 1.99%) in the corpus of ads.
5. Discussion
This aim of this study had been to analyse the use of dis-









Pacts, coalitions and surveys
Economic policy
Party promotion
Figure 2. Reporting and use of disinformation by topic.
Table 6. Use of disinformation by political party and by topic (%).
Ciudadanos PP Podemos VOX
Topic VIAs Total VIAs Total VIAs Total VIAs Total Total
Spain’s cohesion 5.20 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.55
Pacts and surveys 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.01 0.01
Economic policy 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
Feminism 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02
Democratic quality 0.40 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33
Immigration 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 0.01 0.01
Total 5.60 1.89 0.51 0.06 0.35 0.02 13.33 0.02 1.99
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two 2019 general election campaigns. The corpus was
extracted from the Facebook Ad Library, which was not
available before these elections were held. Therefore,
this comprehensive and novel corpus contributes to pave
the way for future research on political communication
and related computational phenomena (Tufekci, 2015;
Woolley & Howard, 2018).
When performing our analysis on the election cam-
paign ads on Facebook, we were interested in confirm-
ingwhether or not the Spanish political parties leveraged
disinformation tactics identified in previous political pro-
cesses at an international level (Marwick & Lewis, 2017)
and specifically in targeted advertising on Facebook
(Bakir &McStay, 2018; Gray et al., 2020), to persuade par-
ticular sectors of the electorate.
However, the results of our analysis show that
the parties’ approach was much more conventional
(López García, 2016), as it generally copied that of tra-
ditional campaigns, focusing on electoral proposals and
promises, in which in most cases the bias of the facts nar-
rated did not tend to qualify as falsehood (thus respect-
ing the rules of democracy). Our findings reveal that the
Facebook Ad Library per se is not enough to audit disin-
formation campaigns on social networking sites and that
greater efforts should be made in this respect at various
levels (Tucker et al., 2018). As a matter of fact, it could
be claimed that our research shows that the open and
transparent nature of the Facebook Ad Library may be a
factor that explains the relatively low percentage of ads
in our corpus that included elements of disinformation,
because such practices could easily be detected.
The presence of disinformation in the parties’ polit-
ical advertising messages was rather scarce, albeit
not negligible. Although they certainly did not put
Facebook’s capabilities to a widespread use to discrimi-
nate, segment or intoxicate the public debate with false
or misleading information. Even though we did not per-
forman ad segmentation analysis (whichwas beyond the
scope of our study), we have shown that in the context
of the 2019 general election campaigns disinformation
revolved around a highly polarised issue in Spain, as pre-
viously identified in similar studies (Stella et al., 2018):
The country’s cohesion or, more generally, the autonomy
of each one of its regions.
As can be deduced from the specific analysis of each
party, we have also revealed that there were significant
differences between them in terms of their use of adver-
tising. We could establish a dividing line between the tra-
ditional parties, in which we have not detected disinfor-
mation (PSOE and IU) or to a minimum extent (PP), and
the new parties that have emerged as a result of the cri-
sis of the two-party system linked to the recession that
began in 2008 (Ciudadanos, Podemos, and VOX).
The discursive approaches of the latter were very dif-
ferent from those of the former. However, at different
levels and from various approaches they revealed the
two elements of disinformation that we have dealt with
here: the political party as a victim and agent of disin-
formation. As can be seen from previous election cam-
paigns, it seems that the ‘traditional’ parties are taking
longer to abandon the classic forms of campaigning than
their ‘new’ counterparts (López García, 2016), which
shows that, rather than being reduced to the extreme
right of the ideological spectrum, there is a large vari-
ety of political actorswho resort to disinformation tactics
(Bennett & Livingston, 2018).
Finally, our results yet again highlight the difficul-
ties in making a distinction between advertising, propa-
ganda and disinformation. The ads analysed here were
similar in that they were publications appearing in the
Facebook timeline, which were labelled as advertising
(Tandoc et al., 2018) and promoted by a specific politi-
cal organisation to persuade the electorate (Molina et al.,
2019). The partisan rhetoric of these ads sometimes
included elements of disinformation and incorrect data
to win votes. Although they should be understood as
being integrated in a complex system (Marwick & Lewis,
2017) in which misleading information reflects different
discourses, ad and distribution strategies and authors.
The phenomenon of disinformation is inextricably linked
to the analysis of the messages of networked politicians
(Marwick & Lewis, 2017), evenwhen they take the shape
of ads that are freely accessible to the public on the plat-
form attempting to audit them.
At a theoretical level, we concur with those authors
who stress the epistemological difference between dis-
information and fake news (Bennett & Livingston, 2018;
Ireton & Posetti, 2018). The centrality of fake news in the
analysis of political processes may lead to an oversimpli-
fication of content deliberately intended to spread dis-
information and the actors disseminating it. Our empiri-
cal findings show that disinformation is not always pro-
duced and distributed by the media and is indeed a
propaganda tool (Benkler et al., 2018; Martin, 1982).
Internet technologies have provided a new setting for
understanding the tactics implemented by political par-
ties to influence public opinion, which not only include
ads containing false information, but also bots, polarised
groups on social networking sites, media manipulation
and even the regular use of social media by political lead-
ers. Future research should approach these phenomena
holistically so as to gain a better understanding of dis-
information strategies and a more accurate perspective
of the links between disinformation and propaganda in
contemporary politics. For example, it would be interest-
ing to monitor not only the agents—in this case, politi-
cal parties—but also specific keywords or topics that are
shaping a more complex information landscape.
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